\u3cem\u3eBeaty\u3c/em\u3e and the Beast: A Prisoner’s Due Process Right to Notice of Changes to Execution Protocols by Chazen, Colin
Boston College Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 6 Electronic Supplement Article 14
4-20-2012
Beaty and the Beast: A Prisoner’s Due Process Right
to Notice of Changes to Execution Protocols
Colin Chazen
Boston College Law School, colin.chazen@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colin Chazen, Beaty and the Beast: A Prisoner’s Due Process Right to Notice of Changes to Execution Protocols, 53 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 159
(2012), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol53/iss6/14
BEATY AND THE BEAST: A PRISONER’S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHT TO NOTICE OF CHANGES 
TO EXECUTION PROTOCOLS 
Abstract: On May 25, 2011, in Beaty v. Brewer, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner’s due process rights do not in-
clude the right to notice or to appeal a last-minute change to a state’s 
method of execution. In doing so, the court established a loophole, per-
mitting states to avoid Eighth Amendment challenges to execution proto-
cols by waiting until the final moment to amend them. This Comment ar-
gues that implicit within a prisoner’s right to challenge a state’s method 
of execution is a due process right to timely notice of changes to that 
method of execution. 
Introduction 
 Eighteen hours before Donald Beaty’s scheduled execution, the 
State of Arizona announced that it would substitute a new drug as the 
first drug in the three-drug lethal injection sequence at his execution.1 
This last-minute substitution prompted Beaty to request an injunction 
or temporary restraining order.2 Beaty claimed that the use of the new 
drug would violate his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.3 After failing to obtain a stay in 
lower courts, Beaty appealed to a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, which denied his request.4 In May 2011, in Beaty v. 
Brewer, the Ninth Circuit voted against rehearing the case en banc, and 
the State executed Beaty.5 
 Courts have differed as to whether the last-minute substitution of a 
new drug as part of an execution protocol violates an inmate’s constitu-
                                                                                                                      
1 Beaty v. Brewer, 649 F.3d 1071, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
2 See Beaty v. Brewer, 791 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679 (D. Ariz.), aff’d, 649 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
3 Id. at 679–80. 
4 Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1072 (denying request for injunctive relief). 
5 Id. at 1071–72 (denying rehearing en banc); JJ Hensley & Jim Walsh, Arizona Inmate Put 
to Death by Lethal Injection, Ariz. Republic (May 25, 2011, 10:36 PM), http://www.azcentral. 
com/community/tempe/articles/2011/05/24/20110524arizona-supreme-court-stops-execu- 
tion-donald-beaty.html. 
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tional rights.6 On the one hand, on May 19, 2011, a mere week before 
Beaty was decided, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in 
Powell v. Thomas, held that a drug substitution did not violate an in-
mate’s Eighth Amendment rights.7 In Powell, the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s ruling that an amendment or change to a 
lethal injection protocol, absent timely notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, does not constitute a due process violation.8 On the other hand, 
one federal district court has held that “fundamental fairness, if not 
due process,” requires that an inmate receive timely notice of changes 
to a state’s execution protocol.9 
 In declining to rehear Beaty’s case en banc, the Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed the Eleventh Circuit, effectively denying a prisoner meaningful 
review of changes to the state’s method of execution.10 As a result, the 
Ninth Circuit rendered the right to challenge execution protocols a 
practical nullity.11 Furthermore, the court’s determination creates a 
potential loophole that will allow states to avoid challenges to their exe-
cution protocols by waiting until the final moment to make changes or 
amendments to those protocols.12 
 Part I of this Comment provides an overview of Beaty’s conviction 
and his request for an injunction or temporary restraining order.13 Part 
II discusses recent cases addressing an inmate’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to receive notice of changes to an execution protocol.14 Fi-
nally, Part III examines flaws in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.15 Further, 
it argues that the right to timely notice of changes to the method of 
execution is implicit in an inmate’s right to challenge a state’s method 
of execution.16 
                                                                                                                      
6 See Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district 
court’s denial of a stay of execution after Alabama substituted of pentobarbital for sodium 
thiopental weeks before plaintiff’s execution); Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1337, 1339–40 
(10th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s denial of a stay in response to Oklahoma’s substi-
tution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental on eve of plaintiff’s execution). 
7 See 641 F.3d at 1258. 
8 See id. 
9 See Oken v. Sizer, 321 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (D. Md. 2004). 
10 See Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1072 (denying rehearing en banc); id. at 1073 (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
11 See id. at 1072 (majority opinion). 
12 See id. 
13 See infra notes 17–42 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 43–59 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 60–84 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 60–84 and accompanying text. 
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I. Beaty’s Conviction, Appeals, and the Ninth Circuit’s Denial 
of His Request for an Injunction 
 In June 1985, a jury convicted Donald Edward Beaty for the sexual 
assault and murder of Christy Ann Fornoff, a thirteen-year-old girl from 
Tempe, Arizona.17 The trial judge sentenced Beaty to death.18 Beaty 
repeatedly appealed his conviction over the next twenty years.19 In 
2009, his conviction became final.20 
                                                                                                                     
 Having exhausted all avenues for appealing his conviction, Beaty 
continued to delay his sentence by challenging Arizona’s method of 
execution as a violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.21 In 2009, Beaty filed suit with six other death row inmates 
against the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC).22 The district 
court rejected Beaty’s claim, holding that Arizona’s lethal injection pro-
tocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment.23 It did so by reasoning 
that Arizona’s lethal injection protocol provided more safeguards than 
Kentucky’s, which the U.S. Supreme Court, in 2008, upheld as constitu-
tional in Baze v. Rees.24 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in Dickens v. Brewer, 
affirmed the district court.25 
 Because the Ninth Circuit upheld Arizona’s execution protocol in 
Dickens, Beaty had no further avenues for appeal.26 The state set the 
date of his execution for May 25, 2011.27 Yet eighteen hours before 
Beaty’s scheduled execution, the ADC announced that it had substi-
tuted pentobarbital for sodium thiopental, the first drug in its three-
drug lethal injection combination.28 In response, Beaty filed a motion 
 
 
17 State v. Beaty, 762 P.2d 519, 524 (Ariz. 1988). 
18 Id. 
19 Hensley & Walsh, supra note 5. 
20 Beaty v. Ryan, 130 S. Ct. 364 (2009) (mem.) (denying petition for writ of certiorari). 
21 See Dickens v. Brewer, No. CV07–1770-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1904294, at *1 (D. Ariz. 
July 1, 2009). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at *19–20. 
24 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008); Dickens, 2009 WL 1904294, at *19–20. 
25 631 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). 
26 Michael Kiefer, Execution Date Set for Inmate in 1984 Tempe Murder, Ariz. Republic (Apr. 
20, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2011/04/ 
20/20110420beaty0420.html. 
27 Id. 
28 See Beaty, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 679, 682. Prior to the substitution, Arizona’s protocol pro-
vided for the use of three drugs: (1) sodium thiopental, a barbiturate that causes uncon-
sciousness; (2) pancuronium bromide, a muscle relaxant that induces paralysis; and (3) po-
tassium chloride, which triggers cardiac arrest. Id. See generally Execution Procedures, ADC 
(2012), available at http://www.azcorrections.gov/Policies/700/0710.pdf (describing Ari-
zona’s execution procedures and chemical makeup of lethal injection syringes). The ADC 
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for a stay of execution with the Arizona Supreme Court and the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Arizona.29 He argued that the drug 
substitution posed a substantial risk of violating his Eighth Amendment 
right against cruel and unusual punishment and his due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.30 
 In his Eighth Amendment claim, Beaty argued that as a result of 
the last-minute substitution of pentobarbital, ADC employees would 
lack the training necessary to administer the drug properly, putting 
him at risk of serious harm.31 Although a recent medical study has 
questioned the efficacy of sodium thiopental, alleging that it does not 
fully anesthetize many inmates,32 Beaty did not object to the efficacy of 
pentobarbital as a substitute drug.33 
 In his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Beaty argued that the Due 
Process Clause entitled him to timely notice of changes to Arizona’s 
execution protocol.34 Without that notice, he argued, he would be un-
able to determine whether the changes violated his Eighth Amendment 
rights.35 According to Beaty, the State violated this entitlement by failing 
to notify him of the drug substitution until the day before his execution, 
depriving him of the time necessary to review the substitution.36 
 The district court denied Beaty’s request for injunctive relief.37 
Beaty then filed an emergency motion with the Ninth Circuit seeking 
an injunction or a temporary restraining order.38 A panel of the Ninth 
Circuit denied Beaty’s motion, holding that he failed to show that he 
was entitled to injunctive relief.39 Beaty then appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which denied his petition for certiorari.40 While the Supreme 
Court was reviewing Beaty’s petition, a Ninth Circuit judge requested a 
                                                                                                                      
made the substitution in response to a request from the U.S. Department of Justice, which 
was concerned that the ADC had failed to complete the forms required to import sodium 
thiopental. Beaty, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 680. 
29 Beaty, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 679 & n.1. 
30 See id. at 680. 
31 Id. at 683. 
32 See Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 
365 Lancet 1412, 1414 (2005). 
33 See Beaty, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 683. 
34 See id. at 685. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at 679–80. 
37 Id. at 680. 
38 Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1072. 
39 Id. 
40 Beaty v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2929 (2011) (mem.) (denying petition for writ of certio-
rari); Hensley & Walsh, supra note 5. 
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vote on whether to rehear the panel’s decision en banc.41 A majority of 
non-recused judges voted to deny rehearing en banc, and the panel’s 
order became final.42 
II. The Implicit Right to Notice of Changes in  
Execution Protocols 
 In his complaint, Beaty argued that by notifying him of its drug 
substitution less than twenty-four hours before his scheduled execution, 
Arizona had deprived him of his due process rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment.43 Yet, that claim was made against a backdrop of 
predominantly contrary precedent.44 In the few cases that have consid-
ered the issue, most courts have held that the Due Process Clause re-
quires neither notice of changes to a state’s method of execution nor 
an opportunity to respond and be heard.45 
 No court has proffered a rational for why an inmate does not have 
a right to notice of changes to a state’s method of execution under the 
Due Process Clause.46 Furthermore, those courts that have held that 
the Due Process Clause might not entitle inmates to notice have based 
their decisions on the fact that no other court has recognized such a 
right.47 For example, in 2011, in Powell v. Thomas, the U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied an inmate’s motion 
for a stay of execution in response to the State’s last-minute substitution 
of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental.48 The court held that denial 
                                                                                                                      
41 Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1072 (denying rehearing en banc); id. at 1074 (Tallman, J., con-
curring). 
42 Id. at 1072 (majority opinion). 
43 See Beaty v. Brewer, 791 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681 (D. Ariz.), aff’d, 649 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
44 See, e.g., Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011); Clemons v. Craw-
ford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1129 n.9 (8th Cir. 2009); Cook v. Brewer, No. CV 10–1454-PHX-RCB, 
2011 WL 251470, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 26, 2011). 
45 See, e.g., Powell, 641 F.3d at 1258; Clemons, 585 F.3d at 1129 n.9; Cook, 2011 WL 
251470, at *5. 
46 See, e.g., Clemons, 585 F.3d at 1129 & n.9 (noting the lack of authority for the proposi-
tion that prisoners have a due process right to examine the backgrounds of execution per-
sonnel and declining to reach due process claim because plaintiffs dropped claim on ap-
peal); Powell v. Thomas, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1283 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (reasoning that no 
authority supports the assertion that inmates have a due process right to notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard about drug substitutions in execution protocols); Cook, 2011 WL 251470, 
at *5 (noting that plaintiff failed to identify authority supporting assertion of due process 
right to information about state’s method of execution). 
47 See, e.g., Clemons, 585 F.3d at 1129 & n.9; Powell, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 1283; Cook, 2011 
WL 251470, at *5. 
48 784 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. 
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was appropriate because no authority supported the plaintiff’s assertion 
that an inmate has a due process right to receive notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in response to a drug substitution in an execution 
protocol.49 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a stay, concluding that the 
substitution did not violate the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.50 
 In contrast, two district courts, in response to this lack of explicit 
authority, reasoned that an inmate’s right to notice is implicit in broader 
notions of the Due Process Clause.51 Furthermore, of those, one court 
noted that courts had implicitly recognized that right by reviewing the 
constitutionality of execution protocols.52 In 2004, in Oken v. Sizer, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held that “[f]undamen-
tal fairness, if not due process,” demands that the State notify an inmate 
of the protocol to be used at the inmate’s execution a reasonable time 
amount of prior to execution.53 In Oken, the court noted the dearth of 
cases establishing an inmate’s right to notice of a state’s execution pro-
tocol.54 Thus, the court relied on numerous cases in which courts had 
reviewed challenges to execution protocols, reasoning that the fact that 
courts had heard these challenges “presuppose[d]” prisoners’ right to 
notice of changes to protocols.55 In addition, the court looked to 
broader notions of due process and concluded that the Due Process 
Clause requires notice of changes to protocols.56 
 Further, in 2009, in Dickens v. Brewer, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona noted that inmates—including Beaty, a party to that 
case—are entitled to notice of changes to the state’s execution protocol 
that will be in place at the time of their execution.57 Similar to the 
court in Oken, the court in Dickens assumed that the right to notice was 
implicit in notions of fundamental fairness and due process.58 There-
fore, in both Dickens and Oken the courts recognized the right to notice 
of changes to a state’s method of execution.59 
                                                                                                                      
49 Id. 
50 Powell, 641 F.3d at 1258. 
51 See Dickens v. Brewer, No. CV07–1770-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1904294, at *23 n.9 (D. 
Ariz. July 1, 2009); Oken v. Sizer, 321 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (D. Md. 2004). 
52 See Oken, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 665. 
57 See 2009 WL 1904294, at *23 n.9. 
58 See id.; Oken, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
59 See Dickens, 2009 WL 1904294 at *23 n.9; Oken, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
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III. The Ninth Circuit’s Denial of Beaty’s Right to Due Process 
 Implicit in the right to challenge a state’s method of execution is 
an inmate’s right to notice of changes to the state’s execution proto-
col.60 Without such protection, an inmate may be unable to ensure that 
the protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment freedom from 
cruel and unusual punishment.61 Yet the Ninth Circuit panel, both in 
its decision to deny injunctive relief and to deny rehearing en banc 
failed to recognize Beaty’s due process right to timely notice of the 
State of Arizona’s substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental.62  
Courts should recognize, however, that long-standing death penalty 
jurisprudence implicitly grants inmates the right to receive notice and 
an opportunity to be heard when a State changes the execution proto-
col.63 This was the position taken by Judge Stephen Roy Reinhardt in 
his dissent in Beaty, and by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maryland, in 2004, in Oken v. Sizer, which held that “[f]undamental 
fairness, if not due process,” requires that inmates receive notice of a 
state’s execution protocol in a timely manner.64 
 Courts have repeatedly recognized that an inmate has a right to 
challenge a state’s method of execution for compliance with the Eighth 
Amendment.65 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently expanded 
an inmate’s ability to do so.66 In 2006, in Hill v. McDonough, the Su-
preme Court held that method of execution challenges may proceed 
                                                                                                                      
60 See infra notes 70–84 and accompanying text. 
61 See Beaty v. Brewer, 649 F.3d 1071, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., dissent-
ing); Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the Eight 
Amendment might entitle plaintiff to notice of change in method of execution if a change 
were sufficiently significant). 
62 See Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1071–72 (denying rehearing en banc); id. at 1072 (denying re-
quest for injunctive relief). 
63 See id. at 1072–73 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Oken v. Sizer, 321 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 
(D. Md. 2004). 
64 See Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1072–73 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Oken, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 
664. 
65 See Oken, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
66 See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 580–81 (2006). See generally Harvey Gee, Eighth 
Amendment Challenges After Baze v. Rees: Lethal Injection, Civil Rights Lawsuits, and the Death 
Penalty, 31 B.C. Third World L.J. 217 (2011) (discussing opportunities for prisoners to 
bring method of execution challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Megan Greer, Legal Injec-
tion: The Supreme Court Enters the Lethal Injection Debate: Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 
(2006), 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 767 (2007) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in Hill v. McDonough will allow for additional method of execution challenges); 
Liam J. Montgomery, Note, The Unrealized Promise of Section 1983 Method-of-Execution Chal-
lenges, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1987 (2008) (noting the increased opportunities for method of exe-
cution challenges under Hill v. McDonough). 
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and do not have to be brought as actions for 
habeas corpus.67 Prior to Hill, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) banned second or successive petitions for 
habeas corpus, and thus prevented many inmates from challenging a 
state’s method of execution.68 Therefore, in Hill, the Court demon-
strated that inmates should have a broader right to challenge the state’s 
method of execution than was previously granted under the AEDPA.69 
 From this principle of death penalty jurisprudence—that inmates 
have the right to challenge their method of execution—-it follows that 
states must provide prisoners with notice of changes to the method of 
execution.70 Were it otherwise, states could evade challenges by waiting 
until the last minute to amend their execution protocols, thereby im-
peding prisoners from exercising their right to review their method of 
execution.71 As Judge Reinhardt noted in his dissent, in reality, if states 
do not have to provide inmates with notice, inmates’ right to challenge 
execution protocols would be “meaningless.”72 
 Furthermore, the right to challenge a state’s method of execution 
is an essential aspect of our nation’s system of capital punishment.73 
This is because the right of an inmate to challenge his method of exe-
cution provides a means to challenge the appropriateness of the pun-
ishment in the eyes of the public and the Court.74 This assurance, that 
all possible measures have been taken to ensure both the accuracy of 
the conviction and the appropriateness of the punishment, imbues the 
application of capital punishment with legitimacy.75 This assurance is 
particularly necessary to ensure the legitimacy of capital punishment, 
                                                                                                                      
67 See 547 U.S. at 580–81. 
68 See Kyle P. Reynolds, Comments, “Second or Successive” Habeas Petitions and Late Ripen-
ing Claims After Panetti v. Quarterman, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1475, 1475 (2007). In most cases 
since Hill, the plaintiff previously filed a habeas corpus petition, and thus would have been 
prohibited by AEDPA from bringing his claim as a habeas petition. See Montgomery, supra 
note 66, at 2001. 
69 See Hill, 547 U.S. at 580–81. 
70 See Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1078 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Oken, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
71 See Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1078 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Oken, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
72 See Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1078 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
73 See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 
319, 333–45 (1997) (describing long history of Eighth Amendment challenges to methods 
of execution). 
74 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). See generally Montgomery, 
supra note 66 (discussing the role of method of execution challenges in protecting prison-
ers against unconstitutional executions). 
75 See Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas Capital Ap-
peals, 18 J.L. & Pol. 773, 775 (2002) (noting capital punishment system assumes govern-
ment executes only the guilty). 
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because the Supreme Court has recognized that “death is different” 
from imprisonment and thus requires a heightened degree of reliabil-
ity.76 Inmates can only be said to have been given this right, however, if 
the process they were afforded meets constitutional requirements.77 
 In Beaty, the process failed to meet the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause, thus undermining the legitimacy of Arizona’s system of 
capital punishment.78 Although the Arizona Supreme Court, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Arizona, and a panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit reviewed Beaty’s claim, the review of each of those courts failed to 
comport with constitutional requirements.79 With less than twenty-four 
hours to demonstrate the merits of his claim—that the change to the 
execution protocol would violate his Eighth Amendment rights—Beaty 
could not fully act upon the process these courts afforded him.80 This 
time constraint exemplified the concern against which the Due Process 
Clause is designed to protect. As the Supreme Court, in 1950, in Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., stated, the “right to be heard 
has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is 
pending . . . .”81 
 Furthermore, both Beaty and the ADC should have expected a stay 
of execution to allow Beaty to evaluate Arizona’s amendment to its exe-
cution protocol.82 This is because in 2009, in Dickens v. Brewer, the Dis-
trict of Arizona, reviewing a challenge to Arizona’s execution protocol 
by Beaty and other inmates, noted that there was “no dispute that each 
Plaintiff is entitled to notice of any amendment to the Arizona Protocol 
if the amendment will be in effect for the Plaintiff’s execution.”83 Thus, 
in failing to follow this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit has introduced 
uncertainty into method of execution litigation and established a po-
tential loophole that will allow states to avoid challenges to their execu-
                                                                                                                      
76 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (stating that death is qualitatively different from impris-
onment, requiring a corresponding difference in reliability); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 370 (1995) (describing Supreme Court’s requirement 
of “heightened reliability” in capital cases). 
77 See Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1078 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 1071–72 (Tallman, J., dissenting); Beaty, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 680. 
81 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
82 See Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1071–72 (denying rehearing en banc); id. at 1072 (denying in-
junctive relief); Dickens v. Brewer, No. CV07–1770-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1904294, at *23 
n.9 (D. Ariz. July 1, 2009). 
83 See Dickens, 2009 WL 1904294, at *23 n.9. 
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tion protocols by waiting until the last minute to amend those proto-
cols.84 
Conclusion 
 In Beaty, the Ninth Circuit held that an inmate’s due process rights 
do not include the right to receive notice or to appeal a change to a 
state’s method of execution. In doing so, however, the court established 
a loophole by which a state may avoid Eighth Amendment challenges 
by amending execution protocols at the eleventh hour. By failing to 
give Beaty notice and opportunity to challenge the change in execution 
protocol, the Ninth Circuit cast doubt over the legitimacy of Arizona’s 
use of capital punishment. Essential to maintaining that legitimacy is 
permitting inmates to exercise their due process rights to review the 
states’ methods of execution. Without that right, the public cannot en-
sure that states will administer the death penalty in a humane manner. 
A defendant, however, cannot be said to have been afforded this right 
absent notice and an opportunity to be heard. The right to challenge 
absent notice has no utility. 
Colin Chazen 
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